We study …rm performance dynamics in retail growth using a dynamic model of expansion that allow these dynamics to operate through an unobserved serially correlated process. The model is estimated with data on convenience-store chain di¤usion across Japanese prefectures from 1982 to 2012, whereby an actual merger between two chains takes place in 2001. Given the presence of serial correlation and selection biases in observed revenue, we combine particle …l-tering methods for dynamic games with control functions in revenue regressions. The estimated structural model provides us insights about how performance dynamics evolve before and after the merger. In particular, we demonstrate that the performance dynamics for the merged entity do not improve following the merger.
Introduction
Large retail chains, such as 7-Eleven, Wal-Mart, and McDonald's, have expanded rapidly by entering multiple geographical markets and opening many outlets. Motivated by the growing dominance of chains in retail, the study of drivers behind their entry and expansion strategies has received growing interest by researchers (e.g., Beresteanu, Ellickson, and Misra, 2010; Blevins, Khwaja, and Yang, 2014; Hollenbeck, 2013b; Holmes, 2011; Igami and Yang, 2014; Nishida, 2014a; Orhun, 2013; Suzuki, 2013; Toivanen and Waterson, 2005, 2011; Varela, 2013; Vitorino, 2012; and Yang, 2012, 2013) . Retail chains shape the landscape of retailing through expansion dynamics, where they may become increasingly pro…table when expanding in size, say through performance dynamics such as accumulated customer goodwill (e.g., Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar, 2012) or scale economies (e.g., Aguirregabiria and Ho, 2012; Ellickson, Houghton, and Timmins, 2013; Holmes, 2011; Nishida, 2013b) . For instance, we may see such dynamics materialize through persistence in market shares (Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dubé, 2009 ). However, the underlying performance dynamics are inherently unobservable. Finally, some of these performance advantages may persist over time via …rm-speci…c e¢ ciencies that prevent (or accelerate) organizational forgetting.
Uncovering these performance dynamics is important for …rms and policy makers in industries where mergers occur. A retail chain may be interested in understanding whether a merger boost or disrupt these performance dynamics, while policy makers may be interested in understanding how market structure and e¢ ciencies evolves after the merger. It seems plausible that mergers will have an impact on performance, as the newly combined …rm will have to integrate its corporate culture, logistics, marketing, and overall strategy. Mergers do not necessarily lead to performance gains. Alluding to a well-known failure, retail chains may wish to avoid a scenario like the Wendy's and Arby's merger in 2008. Within a few years of the merger, Wendy's sold Arby's to a private equity …rm due to sluggish growth. From a policy perspective, antitrust authorities may block a merger between multistore retailers when the purported e¢ ciencies by the merging …rms are hard to verify. For instance, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission blocked a merger between Staples and O¢ ce Depot in 1997, two of the three largest nationwide o¢ ce supply superstores. 1 e¢ ciencies would be passed on to consumers (Baker, 1999) . Finally, the fact that many popular (business) media outlets frequently publish stories like "the top 10 best (and worst) mergers" of all time suggests a desire to evaluate mergers, ex post. 2 In this study, we analyze …rm performance dynamics in retail growth, before and after a merger. Our research uses a dynamic model of expansion and contraction that allows for these performance dynamics to operate ‡exibly through a serially correlated and unobserved pro…tability process, where we contribute to recent literature that incorporates merger events into dynamic oligopoly models (Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev, 2010; Gayle and Le, 2014; Hollenbeck, 2013a; Jeziorski, 2013) . 3 We estimate this model using data on convenience-store chains, including 7-Eleven, LAWSON, Family Mart, circle K, sunkus, and ministop, in all 47 prefectures in Japan from 1982 to 2012. Given the presence of …rm-speci…c and serially correlated unobservables, we make use of an approach akin to Blevins (2014) and Blevins, Khwaja, and Yang (2014) that combine particle …ltering methods with two-step estimation of dynamic discrete choice games in a setting that has retail expansion and contraction. 4 Because both revenue and store counts are observed in our data, 5 the estimated model helps us determine the extent to which performance dynamics operate through demand (i.e., customer goodwill), or …xed costs (i.e., scale economies). However, a challenge of incorporating revenue into our analysis is the inherent selection bias (i.e., we only observe non-zero revenues for markets that the …rms have at least one store). Given this challenge, we augment the particle …ltering method for estimating dynamic games by including the control function approach proposed by Ellickson and Misra (2012) to correct for selection biases when we accurately calibrate revenue. 6 To motivate our structural estimation, reduced form analysis reveals that the relationship be-2 Post-merger evaluation of the validity of claimed cost-e¢ ciencies have been the subject of periodic reports by the OECD; for example, refer to their report Impact Evaluation of Merger Decisions (2011) . See also Homburg and Bucerius (2005) for research that investigates the e¤ects of post-merger integration.
3 For analysis of the incentives behind the mergers themselves, we refer readers to Gugler and Siebert (2007) , Park (2013) , and Uetake and Watanabe (2013) .
4 Blevins (2011) was the …rst to incorporate particle …ltering in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice games. Recently, such methods have been also used in dynamic discrete choice models like Fang and Kung (2012) and Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2010) . In marketing research, linear and non-linear particle …ltering methods have been used in studying dynamic systems (e.g., Bass, Bruce, Majumdar, and Murthi, 2007; Bruce, 2008; Bruce, Foutz, and Kolsarici, 2012; Bruce, Peters, and Naik, 2012; Kolsarici and Vakratsas, 2010) .
5 A growing number of empirical applications of industry dynamics now exploit information about revenues (Dunne et. al., 2013; Hollenbeck, 2013b; Suzuki, 2013) . 6 Note that in a simpler model with fewer choices, one may be able to test for selection biases as in Hollenbeck (2013). tween past size and expansion/revenue di¤ers across chains. In particular, we …nd that past size and expansion/revenue are positively correlated for a number of chains. These …ndings are suggestive of the presence of both accumulated goodwill and scale/scope economies in the industry, and corroborate our structural estimates that reveal the presence of performance dynamics in both sunk cost and revenue channels. This result further stresses the importance of incorporating revenue data into the analysis of expansion dynamics. Furthermore, a comparison of our results across the chains demonstrate substantial heterogeneity in these performance dynamic e¤ects.
With the estimated structural model, we conduct a policy analysis to evaluate the actual merger between circle K and sunkus in 2001. We make use of the fact that our sample time period covers the event where two of the chains merged together by investigating how performance dynamics are a¤ected by the merger. Evaluating performance dynamics for this merger is particularly relevant, as the publicized motive for this merger was to pursue "e¢ ciencies of scale by integrating information systems and improving product margins through joint-purchasing negotiations," where such e¢ ciencies should readily apply to retail expansion operations. 7 Using our baseline merger analysis framework for dynamic games (Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev, 2010) , the estimated model helps us illustrate the counterfactual expansion trajectories for these two chains, which allows us to evaluate whether or not the merger was successful in improving performance dynamics. The estimated model, as well as corresponding simulations, provide us with a few main …ndings. First, the performance dynamics did not improve for the newly merged …rm. Second, the merger appeared to have a revenue increasing e¤ect through brand and competition channels. In an alternative speci…cation that allows for before and after merger policy functions for all chains, we …nd that the lack of improved performance dynamics is a robust result. Furthermore, we are unable to …nd robust evidence of improved pro…tability after the merger, as pro…tability gains are somewhat mixed between the baseline and alternative speci…cations. In summary, our collective …ndings suggest that the circle K and sunkus merger may be viewed unfavorably ex post from the perspective of policy makers as well as the merged entity itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional features of the industry, and provides descriptive statistics and preliminary analysis of the data. Section 3 lays 7 Taken from excerpt the holding company's Investors' Guide 2002 (page 2) available at http://www.circleksunkus.jp/__image__/other/image/company/investor/ir/pdf/ig2002.pdf out the model we use for estimation and simulations. Section 4 goes over our estimation approach.
Section 5 summarizes our main results from estimation, subsequent simulation exercises, as well as results from our alternative speci…cations. Section 6 concludes.
Industry and Data
This section describes the industry we study, and our data from the convenience store chains in Japan (1982 Japan ( -2012 . In our description of the industry, we also provide details about the merger between circle K and sunkus, which is one important industry feature that our data captures.
Preliminary analysis suggests the presence of intertemporal performance dynamics that a¤ect the …rms'future decisions, in that past size and revenue have a noticeable relationship with subsequent expansion e¤orts.
Market De…nition, Data, and Merger Details
Japan has 47 prefectures, and each is a governmental body with a governor, and this paper treats these prefectures as 47 independent geographic markets. Given this de…nition of market, the primary source of market structure data is the annual …nancial statements from the six largest convenience-store chains (7-Eleven, LAWSON, Family Mart, circle K, sunkus, and ministop), which provide the prefecture-level annual sales and the number of stores for each chain. The coverage ranges from 1982 through 2012, and the data are an unbalanced panel because several markets exist where certain chains have not entered yet. The nominal sales across years are de ‡ated by using the annual GDP de ‡ator from the Cabinet O¢ ce.
The demographic variables come from multiple sources. Annual population data at the prefecture level come from the Census Bureau at the Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications.
Annual income data at the prefecture level comes from the Cabinet O¢ ce. We compute the income per capita by markets by dividing the aggregate income at the prefecture level by the population of that prefecture. Hourly minimum wages at the prefecture level, published as the Annual Handbook of Minimum Wage Decisions, are collected by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Annual land price data for multiple points for each of the prefectures are published by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and we take the average across data points for each of the prefectures to construct the price index for that prefecture that year. Table 1 summarizes the variables we use in this paper. 
Patterns in Expansion and Sales
This subsection presents descriptive evidence on the expansion patterns of the convenience-store chains over years. Our interest here is to examine how a chain's past size in a given market, measured by either total sales or total number of outlets, a¤ect the subsequent year's evolution of chains in the number of outlets and total sales. Figure 1 plots the annual change in the number of outlets and the cumulative number of outlets for each chain. The horizontal and vertical axis is the cumulative number of outlets and the change in the number of outlets, respectively. These …gures suggest the higher the size variable, the higher the increase in the total sales in that market.
To examine how past size a¤ects expansion in outlets, Table 2 presents the linear regression of the change in the number of total stores on lagged sales, chain-brand …xed e¤ects, and market characteristics, such as population and income per capita. All speci…cations include market …xed e¤ects. The …rst column suggests that the lagged sales positively a¤ects the change in the number We now direct our attention onto the expansion dynamics for circle K and sunkus, the two chains that merged in 2001. A simple plot of the expansion/contraction patterns for circle K and sunkus ( Figure 2 ) reveals an apparent change in expansion/contraction trends after 2001. Prior to the merger, the total number of circle K and sunkus does not change, or increases. It is not until after the merger do we see contraction in the total number of circle K and sunkus outlets. To further investigate the possibility of a structural break in the expansion dynamics, we conduct a Chow test and see whether the relationship between size and expansion (or change in sales) changes after the merger. Our test reveals that the null hypothesis of "no structural break" is rejected at 1% signi…cance (Table 8) . While such a test result is suggestive of the idea that mergers have an impact on performance dynamics, we are cautious to jump to that conclusion based on this reduced form evidence alone.
To gain more robust insights about performance dynamics and the impact of mergers, we turn to our estimable model that allows for strategic and forward looking expansion/contraction decisions, selection in revenue, and unobservable performance dynamics.
Model
We consider a model with I forward looking …rms in a retail industry that make decisions about operating in market m at time t. At the beginning of time period t and for each given market m, each …rm decides how many new stores to add or subtract, denoted as n imt 2 N i = f K i ; :::; 1; 0; 1; :::; K i g. Based on this decision, the total number of stores that a …rm has in market m and time t evolves according to:
A current period's market structure can then be summarized as N mt = fN imt g i .
In our model …rms are forward-looking, they seek to maximize the discounted pro…t stream P s s imt+s , where imt is the one-shot payo¤ as de…ned by:
The one-shot payo¤ consists of two main components, the revenue, and the …xed cost. Here, revenue is denoted by R i ( ). Revenue is a function of the number of active outlets the chain has in the market (N imt ), market characteristics (X mt ), and the competitive landscape (N imt ). We assume here that …rms play a game of incomplete information, as in Seim (2006) 
Cost is denoted by C i ( ), and is a¤ected by market characteristics, entry costs, expansion costs, and contraction costs. Furthermore, we allow there to be a private information shock and optimization error, as in the revenue speci…cation. Furthermore, unobserved pro…tability may a¤ect the …xed cost component of pro…ts. Because the unobserved pro…tability enter into both revenue and cost, comparisons between R and C would be helpful in determining the extent to which unobserved pro…tability matters for revenue and cost respectively.
A key di¤erence between our model, and typical dynamic oligopoly models of entry is the inclusion of a serially correlated and unobserved pro…tability term. We assume that this unobserved pro…tability follows a simple autoregressive process, which is captured by the following transition equation,
where imt N(0; 2 ) are i.i.d. There are two main components to this unobserved pro…tability measure. The …rst component, i , is the persistence of pro…tability (i.e., organizational forgetting).
The second component, i , is related to movements along the learning curve as the chain's size in a given market that changes over time (i.e., size spillover). 8 Finally, imt are normally distributed i.i.d. innovations to unobserved pro…tability with standard deviation . Heterogeneity across …rms is captured by di¤erent parameters across …rms. Ultimately, this speci…cation allows for …rm-market-speci…c unobserved heterogeneity that is potentially serially correlated. We make the assumption that Z imt is observed by all …rms, but unobserved to the econometrician. However, the model allows for some elements of a …rm's pro…tability to be private information incorporated in imt .
The model's structural parameters can therefore be represented as = f i g I i=1 , where
Given the current pay-o¤ relevant state s imt = (N mt 1 ; X mt ; Z imt ) 2 S, which is known to all players, the …rm's expected total discounted pro…t at time t prior to the private shock imt being realized is given by,
where is the discount factor, 2 (0; 1). The …rm's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of its pro…t at each time period t taking as given the equilibrium action pro…les of other …rms.
The expectations is over the rivals'actions in the current period, the future evolution of the state variables and the private information shock to the …rm in the current period.
We follow Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2008) and analyze the dynamic game of incomplete information using the solution concept of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE 
Given a Markov strategy pro…le imt , the ex-ante value function and the associated Bellman equation for the present discounted value of the stream of pro…ts for …rm i can be written as, 
Estimation
To estimate the model of retail dynamics, we pair the methods proposed by Blevins, Khwaja, and Yang (2014) and Ellickson and Misra (2012) . These methods help us address two key issues.
First, Blevins, Khwaja, and Yang (2014) combine ‡exible particle …ltering techniques with the Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) two-step method to allow for serially correlated and …rm-speci…c unobservables in a dynamic model of retail expansion. 10 The incorporation of particle …ltering helps integrate out the serially correlated unobservables via sequential Monte Carlo re-sampling 1 0 Similar to Blevins (2011) , we use a bootstrap particle …lter (Gordon, Salmond and Smith, 1993) .
procedures, whereby the posterior distribution for the sequence of serially correlated unobservables is successively updated with each simulation draw. 11 Second, Ellickson and Misra (2012) employ propensity-score based methods to address potential selection biases in revenues. As our analysis makes use of revenue data, controlling for such selection biases is important.
Our estimation approach follows three main steps. First, we estimate each …rm's beliefs via policy function approximation, at the same time, employing particle …ltering to obtain the posterior distribution of the serially correlated unobservable. Second, we use the approximated policies to estimate selectivity-corrected revenue equations via regression. In the …nal step, using the calibrated revenue equations, we construct trajectories of pro…ts using forward simulations and estimate remaining cost parameters via Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2008) .
Policy Function Approximation and Particle Filtering
The objective of our …rst stage estimation is to estimate jointly the posterior distributions for the serially correlated unobservables Z imt , as well as the reduced form policy functions for each of the retail chains. These reduced form policy functions are meant to model each chain's decision regarding its expansion or contraction decision, n imt .
As before, we denote X mt to be the vector of exogenous state variables (i.e., population, income, etc...), while Z mt = fZ imt g 8i are vectors for the serially correlated unobservable state variables.
For brevity, let us collect all reduced form parameters pertaining to the …rst stage into , 12 which include the coe¢ cients for the reduced form policy, market …xed e¤ects, and the parameters in the transition of X mt and Z mt . Given the data fn mt ; X mt g, we maximize the following likelihood function:
The likelihood consists of four main components. First, we have the …rm-speci…c choice prob-1 1 Refer to Hu, Shum and Tan (2010) for a discussion about identi…cation of dynamic games with serially correlated and unobserved states. In general, the necessary (but not su¢ cient) requirements for identi…cation include a long panel, and rich transitions in the observed states.
1 2 Note that these parameters are not the same as the structural parameters, . The parameters are reduced form in the sense that they help us approximate the true policy functions, which must be inferred using data. abilities l m , which is estimated via an ordered probit speci…cation (see Appendix). Second, we have the transition probabilities for the exogenous characteristics, p(X mt jX mt 1 ; ); these transition probabilities are estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), which is described in more detail in the Appendix. The …nal component is p(Z mt jN mt 1 ; X mt 1 ; ), which are the posterior distributions for the serially correlated unobservables. Given an initial distribution for the unobserved state and the recursive relation, we can simulate entire sequences for these posterior distributions.
We can then perform the …ltering step using the following:
Here, we update the posterior distribution for Z mt using the joint probability distribution for (n mt 1 ; X mt 1 ). More speci…cally, our …rst stage policy estimation implements the particle …ltering (i.e., sequential Monte Carlo) using the following steps:
1. Initialization: Draw Z r mt from some distribution for each simulation draw r = 1; :::; R.
Recursion:
Repeat the following steps for each t = 1; :::; T .
Importance sampling: Draw Z r mt based on the transition equation for the Z process, and set weights according to w r t = l m (n mt 1 jX mt 1 ; N mt 2 ; Z r mt 1 ; ) for each simulation draw r = 1; :::; R. Note that l m (n mt jX mt 1 ; N mt 2 ; Z r mt ; ) is the probability of observing n mt given the state X mt 1 , and drawn values of Z r mt .
Re-sampling: For each simulation draw r = 1; :::; R, draw posterior valuesZ r mt from collection of Z r mt , in proportion to the weights, w r t , computed in the previous step.
An alternative way to integrate out the unobserved states is the expectation-maximization method by Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) . 13 We choose to deviate from popular convention for the following reasons. First, it is practically easier to incorporate continuous unobserved states using particle …ltering, as opposed to Arcidiacono and Miller's (2011) method that works particularly well for discrete persistent or time-varying unobserved Markovian states. However, the incorporation of discrete unobserved states will require an a priori assumption about the number of unobserved types. 14 Second, and most importantly, we are interested in an unobserved state that evolves both endogenously (through past size N mt 1 ), and stochastically (through draws of imt ).
Estimating the Revenue Function
Our analysis makes use of the fact that we observe …rm-speci…c revenues. However, the realized revenues will su¤er from selection bias that is induced by the underlying dynamic game of expansion, as revenues are only observed for the strategies that are played in equilibrium. Strategies are chosen that maximize discounted pro…ts, and are a function of the same unobserved private shocks that a¤ect revenues, To address the selection bias described above, we follow Ellickson and Misra (2012) , and adopt a propensity-based based method. This procedure amounts to running revenue regressions, with the inclusion of a control function (n imt ). Here,n imt is the predicted number of opened/closed outlets as determined using the …rst stage policy approximation. For the control function, we make it a ‡exible function ofn imt , which is approximated using high order polynomials. The main revenue regression is de…ned as:
To obtainẐ imt , we …rst simulate many trajectories for each market-time. We then obtain the average value of the simulated posteriors to obtainẐ imt . Similarly,n imt is the average number of outlets across simulations for a given market and time. With the estimated parameters, we proceed to the …nal step. Ellickson and Misra (2012) point out that the private information assumption regarding imt helps us simplify the problem greatly, as this assumption allows us to decompose the joint selectivity problem into a collection of individual (…rm-speci…c) selectivity problems.
Note that in our application, we do not run revenue regressions for each possible alternative of n imt , but instead use the predicted numbern imt via simulations as a su¢ cient statistic. The main reason we make this simpli…cation is the avoid the curse of dimensionality associated with many multinomial choice problems. For example, if there are 8 expansion/contraction options a …rm can make as to how many stores to subtract or add, and if we used a second order polynomial approximation for the control function, we would have to estimate 32 parameters alone for the selectivity correction component alone.
Estimating the Pro…t Function
The …nal stage of our estimation proceeds using Bajari, Benkard, and Levin's (2007) forward simulation approach, which allows us to recover the structural parameters given the estimated …rst stage parameters . The estimated …rst stage parameters allow us to forward simulate the policies, exogenous state variables, and serially correlated unobserved states.
For any given initial state S 1 = (N 0 ; X 1 ; Z 1 ), we can then forward simulate the following:
Subscript s represents each simulation, where S paths of length T are simulated in the second stage. The term (S s ; s ) denotes a vector of simulated actions based on the policy pro…le . With this construction of forward simulated actions and payo¤s, we can then consider perturbations of the policy function to generate B alternative policies. With each alternative policy, we can obtain the forward simulated pro…t stream using the previous two steps. We let b index the individual inequalities, with each inequality consisting of an initial market structure and state
, an index for the deviating …rm i, and an alternative policy~ i for …rm i. The di¤erence in valuations for …rm i using inequality b is denoted by
This di¤erence should be positive in equilibrium. Therefore, this criterion listed below identi…es â to minimize the violations of the equilibrium requirement:
Incorporating Actual Merger Events
One of the interesting features of our setting is that in 2001, sunkus and circle K merged into one entity. 15 This means that our sample of observations may be split into pre-and post-merger time periods. When estimating the data, we make a similar assumption as Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and
Lazarev (2010) for our baseline analysis, in that the equilibrium being played does not change after the merger (i.e., each …rms'strategy function does not change). The authors argue that such a case may be valid if either mergers are a standard occurrence in equilibrium, or if mergers are rare and thus equilibrium play is not markedly a¤ected by the likelihood of future mergers. In our setting, we will rely on the latter assumption, as mergers are very rare in the Japanese convenience store industry. With this assumption, we can then forward simulate the industry outcomes before and after the merger using the same policy function, whereby the merger's main e¤ect would materialize through a sudden change in the state.
More speci…cally, our estimation will make use of the following states. Before the merger, we make use of the actual N imt in the …rst stage policy function estimation for sunkus and circle K. After the merger, we set N imt = 0 for sunkus and circle K, and make use of the actual N imt for the merged entity called C&S in the …rst stage policy function estimation. In the forward simulation stage, we take into account the merger by computing the discounted pro…t streams based on whether or not sunkus and circle K has merged. Note that unlike Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2010) , the merger between sunkus and circle K is factual, and not merely a proposed merger. If instead the C&S merger did not actually occur yet, we would use the pre-merger factual data to obtain …rst stage policy function approximations, which would then be used to forward simulate market structure dynamics in light of a hypothetical merger at some date.
The assumption that the equilibrium does not change before the merger requires some justi…-cation. For example, one or both of the companies may have an incentive to adjust their expansion/sales strategies as a means to make themselves more attractive as merger targets. To check that equilibrium behavior is not erratic leading up to the merger, we plot the trajectory of store As a robustness check, we try relaxing this assumption about the equilibrium by considering an alternative setting in which each …rm's policy function changes after the merger. Unlike a setting in which a merger did not actually happen (i.e., is a counterfactual), we have many observations both before and after the merger. It is worthwhile considering such an extension, as all the chains may shift their policies immediately after the merger. To implement this extension, we follow the same estimation procedure as before, except with one key modi…cation. In the …rst stage policy function estimation, we now allow for di¤erent policy functions (for all chains) before and after the merger. An important assumption we maintain is that the chains do not have ex ante expectations about the merger prior to the event. 
Main Results
For all of the speci…cations we estimate, we report bootstrap standard errors. The …rst stage order probit is estimated using sieve maximum likelihood that includes all exogenous variables and relevant interactions; this …rst stage policy approximation is paired with particle …ltering that uses R = 1; 000 simulation draws (i.e., particle "swarms") so as to integrate out the unobserved pro…tability. With the …rst stage estimates, we then run our revenue regressions that incorporate control functions. In the second stage, we use B = 1; 000 simulated inequalities. Each inequality contains an alternative policy function that we generated by perturbing the coe¢ cients in the …rst stage policy function. Finally, we obtain standard errors using block bootstrapping.
Unobserved Pro…tability
We now report the estimates from the …rst stage. The …rst stage estimates we focus our discussion around are those pertaining to the unobserved pro…tability process (Table 9) . 16 In general, we see some heterogeneity in these estimates across the chains. For instance, the …rm …xed e¤ect ( ) is largest for ministop. The retention e¤ect ( ) is largest for circle K. Finally, we see that the size spillover ( ) is largest for LAWSON.
Focusing our attention on the merged …rms, sunkus and circle K, we see that the parameters related to unobserved pro…tability change after the merger. In particular, we see that the …rm …xed after, Z process) of circle K and sunkus combined. After 2001, we then graph two scenarios ( Figure   4 ). First, we plot the evolution of the Z process using the estimated Z parameters for the merged circle K and sunkus (solid line), and contrast this with the evolution of the Z process using the estimated Z parameters for the individual circle K and sunkus Z parameters (dashed line). The graph reveals that the unobserved pro…tability actually decreased after the merger, as compared to the hypothetical case in which no merger took place in 2001. Such a decline is consistent with a diminished size spillover e¤ects, as well as the merged …rm's inability to retain gains from the unobserved pro…tability process. This decline in the unobserved pro…tability suggests that both companies were unable to exploit the gains from merger, either through the demand or cost side (or both), and this result is consistent with both stories. For instance, as we describe in the earlier section, fully integrating the operations took six more years after 2001. Also, from the demand side, both chain brands are kept separate, such that they might have been unable to exploit economies of scope and scale due to merger, such as a joint advertising on TV.
As the merger had a noticeable impact on the Z process, we look more closely at how the dynamics in store expansion changed in light of the merger. In a similar manner as in the previous diagram, we plot the trajectory of averaged number of new outlets (across S simulations and M markets) based on the estimated policy functions and posterior distributions for the Z process. As before, we highlight two scenarios after 2001 ( Figure 5 ). Here, we are comparing the evolution of the number of new outlets for the merged circle K and sunkus (solid line), and contrast it with the evolution using the estimated Z process for circle K and sunkus as independent …rms (dashed line). Consistent with the drop in unobserved pro…tability, we see that the two …rms would have expanded faster had they not merged into one entity. More speci…cally, the average number of new outlets added is simulated to be 8 in the hypothetical scenario in which the …rms do not merge, and is 5 in the actual scenario in which the merger actually took place.
Revenue
Table 10 displays the main results from our revenue regressions. For the control function speci…cation, we choose a simple third-order polynomial, which is a ‡exible non-linear function of the predicted number of added or subtracted outletsn imt :
With this speci…cation for the control function, we see that for all of the chains,n imt appears to have a positive (albeit non-monotonic) e¤ect on revenue through (n imt ). 17
First note that revenues are a positive function of the number of own outlets, as one would expect. Furthermore, this positive relationship with size is magni…ed in markets with higher in- comes, and for some chains such as 7-Eleven, sunkus, and circle K, higher population accentuates the positive e¤ect of own size. Competition appears to have a dampening e¤ect on the own size e¤ect for some chains, as one would expect. Finally, we see that the unobserved pro…tability is positively associated with revenue for most of the chains. This …nding suggests that the unobserved pro…tability process may also operate through revenue, in addition to sunk costs (which we will demonstrate in the next set of results).
From the estimates, we can also evaluate how the determinants of revenue changed for sunkus and circle K after the merger. There are a few noticeable changes. First, the relationship between the number of stores and revenue is much stronger after the merger. This …nding suggests that the merger may have increased the awareness for the two brands, and hence, a subsequent increase in revenue per store would be consistent with such a conjecture; even though they kept their brand names separate, such increase in awareness would be bene…cial to both …rms. Second, the competition e¤ect as measured through the interaction between number of own and rival stores is severely dampened, so much so that the rival stores no longer exert business stealing e¤ects. It is likely that sunkus and circle K were close substitutes prior to the merger such that a merger may have eliminated key competition that would reduce each chain's revenue. 18 Finally, we see that the role of unobserved pro…tability in revenue now has a negative sign. Note that as the unobserved pro…tability approaches zero after the merger (Figure 4) , we should interpret this seemingly counterintuitive result as highlighting the dampened impact of unobserved pro…tability 
Pro…t Function
We now move on to the second stage estimates (Table 11 ). For nearly all of the chains, we con…rm that both revenue and unobserved pro…tability enter into the one-shot payo¤ in a positive manner. 19 It is interesting to note that the relative role of revenue varies across chains. We see that revenue contributes heavily to the one-shot pay-o¤ for circle K, while unobserved pro…tability contributes heavily to the one-shot payo¤ for 7-Eleven. Interestingly, the entry cost decreases for sunkus and circle K after merger whereas the expansion cost increases after merger. Furthermore, we see that the e¤ect of sunk costs on one-shot payo¤s appear to be similar in magnitude to revenue and unobserved pro…tability e¤ects. Finally, it appears that minimum wage and land price act as costs for most of the chains, with the exception of 7-Eleven and LAWSON. One reason we may see positive e¤ects of these cost-side variables is that minimum wage and land price may be tied with the market's economic growth.
Using the estimated policy functions, revenue equation, and sunk costs, we now evaluate the impact that the merger had on overall pro…tability for circle K and sunkus via simulations. Figure 6 displays the simulated pro…ts. We now compare the simulated pro…ts under the actual equilibrium A few observations from this analysis. First, it appears that without the merger, circle K and sunkus made very low pro…ts. This …nding is re ‡ective of markets that are very competitive.
Second, we see an increase in pro…tability after the merger, relative to the hypothetical case in which no merger takes place. Despite potential harm to performance dynamics (as shown earlier), the merger itself is pro…table. Taken together with our revenue regression results, it would appear that the positive e¤ects from the merger materialize through revenue, and not e¢ ciencies through performance dynamics.
While our analysis has demonstrated the lack of improved performance dynamics in store expansion following the merger, there does appear to be some e¢ ciency gains through lower entry and contraction costs. Lower entry costs can be rationalized by the fact that prior to the merger, circle K and sunkus did not overlap in many markets with respect to their store coverage. In other words, the merger may make it easier for the merged …rm to enter new markets that one of the individual …rms had no prior experience with. We may see lower contraction costs if the merger makes it easier to shut down ine¢ cient or redundant stores. However, as the cost of expansion is higher after the merger, the overall impact of this merger on sunk costs is more nuanced. 
Alternative Speci…cation for Policy Functions
In this section, we explore an alternative speci…cation that allows for policy functions to di¤er, before and after the merger between circle K and sunkus. This speci…cation addresses a potential concern that the equilibrium and strategies by …rms may have changed after the merger. Tables 12   and 13 provide us the main estimates from the unobserved pro…tability process, before and after the merger, respectively. Comparing these tables, we see that the Z process for the chains change after the merger. For example, the retention size spillover e¤ects improve for all of the chains, except for the merged entity after the merger. We conjecture that competitors of circle K and sunkus may have improved their organizational e¢ ciency in response to a potentially larger threat in the form of a merged …rm. Focusing on the merged …rm, we see that after the merger, the …rm …xed e¤ect and size spillover actually lies somewhere in between estimates for the …rms as individual entities prior to the merger. In summary, the estimates from the Z process provide us no evidence that the merger improved performance dynamics for the merged …rm.
Many of our original qualitative …ndings from earlier revenue regressions still hold, although there are some noticeable di¤erences. Table 14 summarizes our main revenue regression results for the alternative policy function speci…cation. As before, we …nd that the relationship between revenue and the number of outlets becomes more pronounced for the merged …rm. Furthermore, we see that the competition e¤ect is dampened signi…cantly for the merged …rm, which is consistent with our baseline analysis. However, unlike our baseline speci…cation, unobserved pro…tability no longer plays a positive role in revenue. This …nding would suggest that unobserved pro…tability likely operates via sunk cost.
The estimates for the pro…t function can be found in Table 15 . From these estimates, we see that after the merger, the weight circle K and sunkus place on unobserved pro…tability decreases.
Furthermore, we see that the weight for revenue is also diminished signi…cantly. A negative sign for the revenue, after the merger, may suggest that our measures of revenue may also be capturing variable cost (with respect to outlet level sales). Taken together, our results point to the merger being unpro…table for the merged entity, which contrasts with the baseline analysis. Also, unlike in the baseline speci…cation, we see no e¢ ciency through lower entry costs after the merger, as the entry costs are actually higher after the merger. We do see a lower contraction cost after the merger.
The lower contraction costs, combined with a markedly positive relationship between pro…tability and land price, suggest a higher scrap value after the merger.
In addition to the lack of improved performance dynamics, one result that appears to persist in both the baseline and alternative speci…cations is an increased value of store closure. Note that as revenue is a function of the number of outlets, the negative coe¢ cient in front of revenue in the pro…t function suggests an even larger value of exit. This augmented value of store closure, after the merger, is consistent with a trend in downsizing after mergers. As a recent anecdote, the newly merged O¢ ce Depot and O¢ ceMax will be closing 20% of their locations by the end of 2016. 20 Similarly, industry experts predict that the proposed merger between Safeway and Albertsons will lead to store closures motivated by asset liquidation. 21
Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of performance dynamics in the long-run evolution of retail expansion. By combining particle …ltering, control functions, and forward simulations, we are able to push the frontier by understanding not only whether such dynamics exist, but what channel these dynamics operate in. Such an approach is especially applicable when revenue information is available to the researcher. We apply these methodological innovations to a setting involving convenience store expansion in Japan, which o¤ers us the unique opportunity to look at dynamics both before and after an actual merger.
Two main …ndings emerge. First, our estimates suggest that the size spillover and retention e¤ects operate through both the sunk cost component of pro…ts, as well as revenue. Knowing that these performance dynamics are related to both channels further justi…es the use of revenue data when analyzing such markets. Second, simulations of the unobserved pro…tability suggests that the merger had a detrimental e¤ect on performance dynamics for the merged entities; that is, the hypothetical joint unobserved pro…tability for the two …rms as un-merged entities after the merger would have been higher than the actual joint unobserved pro…tability. This result persists, even when we consider alternative speci…cations that account for pre versus post merger strategies in each …rm's policy function.
Our current analysis abstracts away two features of the industry. First, we take the 2001 merger as an exogenous event. Although we believe this assumption is a reasonable one to make because mergers and acquisitions rarely happen in this industry, …rms in general endogenously choose when and with whom to merge. Second, we do not consider the ownership composition of the stores;
that is, the dynamics of franchisee versus chain managed outlets. We believe future research in this direction is fruitful for three reasons. First, the performance dynamics may di¤er between franchisee and chain-run stores. Second, the merger may have a di¤erential impact on stores, depending on ownership structure. Finally, the value of store closures may vary across franchisee and chain-run stores. However, to investigate such issues, one would need a new framework for estimating models of dynamic retail expansion with ownership structure decisions. We defer the development of this new framework for our future research. 
Appendix B. More Details about Policy Function Estimation
In particular, we estimate an ordered probit model where the choice set is K i = K = fk 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k K g with k 1 < k 2 < < k K . These values may range from negative to positive, representing expansion and contraction decisions by …rms. With an ordered probit, there is a potential complication in terms of the large number of choices each chain has. For example, a chain may expand by adding as many as 127 outlets in a given market and year. To address such computational issues, we make discrete the actions available based on the raw distributions of n mt . A similar solution is used by Blevins, Khwaja, and Yang (2014) . In our application, we choose K = f 5; 0; 2; 5; 10; 20; 50g. This discretization is chosen based on the most commonly observed expansion decisions we see the retail chains make.
The term y imt captures each …rm's latent index, for which we use a ‡exible functional form to capture. Exogenous state variables are summarized as W mt denote the vector of exogenous state variables that include X mt and relevant interactions between variables. For tractability, we consider a ‡exible linear speci…cation for y imt that includes higher-order terms and interactions:
The serially correlated performance dynamic measure is captured by Z imt , …rm-speci…c pro…tability which is based on the speci…cation for the Z process and is integrated out via particle …ltering.
Finally, we use imt to denote an independent and normally distributed error term with mean zero and unit variance. Firm and market …xed e¤ects are also included, as per the speci…ed Z process.
The order probit speci…cation is summarized by a collection of threshold-crossing conditions: 
. . . . . .
The values # 1 ; : : : ; # K are the K cuto¤ parameters corresponding to each outcome. These cuto¤s are estimated using sieve maximum likelihood along with the index coe¢ cients, and the parameters in the law of motion for Z imt .
